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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.

JOSE ESTEBAN BRUNET,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

NO. 39550
ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2010-13885

APPELLANT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REHEARING

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jose Esteban Brunet respectfully requests rehearing in this case.
The notable question before this Court was whether and to what extent, in an
appeal challenging both the district court's relinquishment of jurisdiction, and its decision
not to reduce the sentence executed when it relinquished jurisdiction, an indigent
defendant-appellant is entitled to production, at State expense, of transcripts of hearings
held prior to the hearing at which jurisdiction was relinquished. This Court, applying the
"colorable need" standard of Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971),
unanimously held that Mr. Brunet was not constitutionally entitled to transcripts (at State
expense) of his original change of plea and sentencing hearings because he "failed to

1

demonstrate a colorable need for those requested transcripts in light of the existing
record on appeal."

State v. Brunet, No. 39550, 2013 Opinion No. 108, p.4 (Idaho

Nov. 13, 2013) (hereinafter, Opinion). 1 Thus, it seems that this Court undertook an ad
hoc analysis, concluding that under the unique facts and circumstances of this case, the

appellate record was adequate for review of Mr. Brunet's substantive claims even
without the requested transcripts. See id. at 4-6.
Mr. Brunet submits that this Court's Opinion, at best, provides no guidance for
future indigent appellants attempting to present an adequate record for appellate
review. Accordingly, Mr. Brunet requests that this Court grant rehearing and either hold
that Mr. Brunet is entitled to the transcripts he seeks or, at a minimum, articulate a
scope of appellate review that makes it clear why: (a) the requested transcripts in this
case are not properly considered on appeal; and (b) under what circumstances in future
cases an appellant may obtain (or, indeed, would be required to obtain) transcripts of
hearings occurring prior to the decision challenged on appeal.
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
The factual and procedural histories of this case were previously set forth in
detail in Mr. Brunet's Appellant's Brief and, therefore, will not be repeated herein.

1

Although not final, this Court's opinion is also available on Westlaw. See State v.
Brunet, _ Idaho_, _ P.3d _, 2013 WL 6001894 (Nov. 13, 2013). However, Mr. Brunet
will be relying upon the pagination of the slip opinion when referring to this Court's
November 13, 2013 opinion.
2

ISSUE
Should the Supreme Court grant rehearing to clarify the standard for production of
transcripts (at State expense) in appeals challenging sentencing-related decisions
following periods of probation and/or retained jurisdiction?

3

ARGUMENT
The Supreme Court Should Grant Rehearing In Order To Clarify The Standard For
Production Of Transcripts (At State Expense) In Appeals Challenging SentencingRelated Decisions Following Periods Of Probation And/Or Retained Jurisdiction
An ongoing challenge in recent years has been determining which hearing
transcripts could, should, or must be made part of the appellate record (at State
expense) when an indigent defendant appeals a sentencing-relating decision following
one or more period of probation or retained jurisdiction. 2 Because such appeals are
common, this is an issue which could easily affect scores of appeals each year in Idaho.
As the present case is an appeal from the district court's relinquishment of
jurisdiction (following a period of probation and a subsequent "rider") and refusal to
reduce the sentence executed, it represents an excellent opportunity to clarify which
pre-relinquishment transcripts can, should, or must be made part of the appellate
record. Obviously, the Court's Opinion in this case attempts to do just that; however,
Mr. Brunet submits that it is inadequate in that regard. Accordingly, Mr. Brunet requests
that this Court rehear his case and, ultimately, either hold that Mr. Brunet is entitled to
the transcripts he seeks, or articulate a scope of appellate review that makes it clear
why the requested transcripts in this case are not properly considered on appeal, and
under what circumstances an appellant may obtain (or, indeed, would be required to
obtain) transcripts of hearings occurring prior to the decision challenged on appeal.

2

Specifically, Mr. Brunet is referring to appeals of district court decisions: (a) revoking
probation; (b) relinquishing jurisdiction; or (c) denying sentence reductions (under
l.C.R. 35) upon, or following, probation revocations or relinquishments of jurisdiction.
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A.

Standard For Evaluating Petitions For Rehearing
Idaho Appellate Rule 42 provides a process for parties aggrieved by an opinion

of the Supreme Court to seek rehearing; however, that Rule does not articulate a
standard for evaluating petitions for rehearing. Indeed, nowhere in the Idaho Appellate
Rules are the grounds for a petition for rehearing articulated.

See generally Idaho

Appellate Rules.
Presumably though, the decision whether to grant rehearing lies in the sound
discretion of this Court.

Cf. I.AR. 118(b) (providing that a decision on a petition for

review from a final decision of the Court of Appeals "is discretionary on the part of the
Supreme Court, and [petitions] will be granted only when there are special and
important reasons" for review to be granted).
B.

The Standard Already Articulated In This Case Is Unclear (At Best) And Should
Be Revised
Throughout this appeal, Mr. Brunet has argued that he was entitled (and, indeed,

required) to augment the appellate record with transcripts of his original change of plea
and sentencing hearings from 2010, even though his appeal was from subsequent
(2011) decisions, made after an intervening period of probation and a period of retained
jurisdiction, to relinquish jurisdiction and deny him a sentence reduction.

Although

Mr. Brunet has always recognized that the decisions challenged on appeal were remote
in time from the hearings for which he sought transcripts, he has consistently argued
that those hearings were nonetheless relevant to the decisions ultimately challenged.
His reasoning was (and remains) as follows:

5

When sentencing a defendant, the district court must evaluate all of the
information and evidence bearing upon the defendant's character, life
situation, and crime. 3
Likewise, when making all subsequent sentencing-related decisions (i.e.,
when deciding whether to revoke probation, relinquish jurisdiction, or
reduce a sentence), the district court must evaluate any new information
and evidence concerning the defendant's character, life situation, and
recent actions, and it must view that new information and evidence in light
of all of the information and evidence already considered in crafting the
original sentence. 4
Because the district court must consider a broad range of information and
evidence bearing on the defendant's character, life situation, and
particular actions, all mitigating and aggravating evidence is relevant to a
sentencing-related determination. 5
Relevant information and evidence to be considered by the district court
includes not only that which is submitted in writing, but also that which is
offered in open court, including witness testimony (whether for or against
the defendant), admissions by the defendant, victim impact statements,
3

See l.C. § 19-2521 (1) (requiring the sentencing court to consider, inter alia, "the nature
and circumstances of the crime and the history, character and condition of the
defendant").
4
See State v. Chapman, 111 Idaho 149, 153-54 (1986) (holding that when a district
court revokes probation, it is to consider not only the most recent probation violation, but
also the underlying offense and the character and prior actions of the defendant).
5
See id. at 153 (holding that when a district court determines whether to revoke
probation, it must consider a "broad range of information about the defendant," and that
"[v]ery little information about a defendant will be irrelevant") (quoting State v. Moore, 93
Idaho 14, 17 (1969)).
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and the defendant's allocution (or analogous statements on his own
behalf). 6
When making a sentencing-related determination, the district court can,
and should, consider the information and evidence offered at all hearings
over which it presided.7
•

When a defendant-appellant challenges a sentencing-related decision of
the district court on appeal, the appellate court will "conduct[ ] an

6

See, e.g., l.C. § 19-5306(1)(e) (codifying the right of crime victims to be "[h]eard, upon
request, at all criminal justice proceedings considering a plea of guilty, sentencing,
incarceration, placing on probation or release"); l.C.R. 33(a)(1) (providing that a
sentencing court "shall" allow the defendant to make a statement and present any
mitigating information).
7
See, e.g., State v. Lombard, 149 Idaho 819, 822-24 (Ct. App. 2010) (affirming
restitution award, in part, based on trial testimony); State v. Blair, 149 Idaho 720 (Ct.
App. 2010) (holding that district court's restitution order, entered at the time of
sentencing, was appropriately supported by the trial evidence); Downing v. State, 136
Idaho 367, 373-74 (Ct. App. 2001) (apparently referring to the trial evidence in holding
"[a] district court is entitled to utilize knowledge gained from its own official positions and
observations . . . and consider a broad range of information when fashioning an
appropriate sentence"); State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6, 18 (Ct. App. 1995) (evaluating a
sentence for excessiveness and finding that the district court's sentencing-related
findings were supported by the trial record, and that the sentence imposed did not
represent an abuse of discretion); State v. Cates, 117 Idaho 90, 94-95 (Ct. App. 1989)
(referring to its prior recitation of the trial evidence (undertaken as part of a sufficiencyof-the-evidence analysis) for a summary of "[t]he facts of the crime" in its analysis of
whether the sentence was excessive).
On this subject, it is important to distinguish prior hearings in the same case from
those in a separate case. With regard to prior proceedings in the same case, the
foregoing authorities suggest the district court can, and indeed should, take into account
the totality of the evidence to which it has been exposed. However, with regard to prior
proceedings in a different case, the district court could not consider those proceedings
without taking judicial notice of the relevant portions of the case at issue. See
Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807-08 (1992) (holding that, in a post-conviction
case, it is improper for the presiding judge to take judicial notice of his own memory of
the separate, underlying criminal case).

7

independent review of the entire record available to the trial court at

.

sen tencmg ....

,,3

If it turns out that the defendant-appellant has failed to designate a record
for appeal constituting the entire record available to the district court
(including certain relevant transcripts of hearings held prior to the
sentencing-related decision challenged on appeal), the missing portions of
the record will be presumed to support the challenged decision and the
defendant-appellant will be denied the opportunity to have his appeal
decided on its actual merits. 9
Specifically, Mr. Brunet argued that because he personally addressed the district court
at both his change of plea and sentencing hearings, 10 and because the same judge

8

State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148
(2008)) (applying this standard in evaluating a district court's revocation of probation
and decision to order this original sentence into execution without reduction). See also
State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 671 ( 1999) ("To determine whether the trial court abused
its discretion, this Court reviews 'all of the facts and circumstances of the case."')
(quoting State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 145 (1991)) (relating to the initial
sentencing decision).
9
See, e.g., State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276-77 (Ct. App. 2000) (holding, in a
sentencing/Rule 35 appeal, that because the defendant-appellant failed to include the
change of plea hearing transcript in the appellate record, that missing transcript would
be presumed to support the district court's sentencing determination); State v. Warren,
123 Idaho 20 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding, in an appeal from a probation revocation and
subsequent Rule 35 motion, all taking place after the defendant had served two periods
of probation and one "rider," that the appellate record was inadequate where it did not
include, inter alia, the sentencing hearing transcript); State v. Wright, 114 Idaho 451,
452-53 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding, in a Rule 35 appeal, that the appellate record was
inadequate where it did not include, inter alia, the sentencing transcript); State v.
Rundle, 107 Idaho 936, 937-38 (Ct. App. 1984) (same).
10
The court minutes from Mr. Brunet's November 12, 2010 change of plea hearing
indicate that Mr. Brunet was "sworn and questioned by the Court." (R., p.54.) The court
minutes from his December 23, 2010 sentencing hearing indicate that, after the
attorneys made their sentencing recommendations to the district court, Mr. Brunet
"ma[de] a statement to the Court." (R., p.72.)

8

(Judge Owen) presided over those hearings as issued the sentencing-related order
challenged on appeal in this case, 11 those hearings not only included information
relevant to any sentencing-related decision made by the district court, but were also part
of the entire record available to the trial court. Accordingly, although Mr. Brunet could
not say that the evidence heard by the district court at the change of plea and
sentencing hearings would change the outcome of his appeal (indeed, he could not
even say that it would be favorable to his appeal), he argued that it was within the scope
of appellate review and, therefore, not only properly made part of the appellate record,
but, under existing Court of Appeals standards, required to be made part of the
appellate record.
This Court rejected Mr. Brunet's ultimate conclusion, although its reason for
doing so is not entirely clear from the Opinion, given that it did not explicitly reject any of
the premises upon which Mr. Brunet's argument was based.

In fact, this Court

confirmed Mr. Brunet's assertion that the facts attendant to the original change of plea
and sentencing were relevant to the subsequent sentencing-related decision challenged
on appeal (see Opinion, pp.4-5 (discussing the plea agreement and the charge to which
Mr. Brunet pied guilty, as well as the pre-sentence investigation report prepared for the
original sentencing)), and it re-affirmed the relevant standard of review: "In examining
the reasonableness of a sentence, this Court conducts an independent review of the
entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, focusing on the objectives of
criminal punishment." (Opinion, p.5 (citing State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010)).)

11

Compare R., pp.53-54 (court minutes for change of plea hearing) and R., pp.71-72
(court minutes for sentencing hearing), with R., p.116 (court minutes for jurisdictional
review hearing).

9

Rather than point out a flaw in Mr. Brunet's reasoning, the Court appears to have
conducted an ad hoc analysis, proffering a handful of reasons why it believes there was
no "colorable need" for the requested transcripts given the unique facts and
circumstances of this case.

(See Opinion, pp.3-6.)

Such an ad hoc approach is

problematic though, as it provides little to no guidance for indigent defendant-appellants
or their attorneys seeking to create adequate records in future appeals, or for district
court judges tasked with ruling on contested objections to appellate records.

And,

because of this lack of clear guidance (especially when taken in conjunction with the
presumption that missing portions of the appellate record support the challenged
decision of the district court), appellants and their attorneys, in an abundance of caution,
would be wise to continue seeking transcripts of past hearings wherein the district court
was presented with information and evidence bearing upon the sentencing-related
decision challenged on appeal.
Further, the specific factors weighed by the Court in this case are not adequate
to overcome the fact that the evidence offered at the change of plea and sentencing
hearings was relevant to sentencing-related rulings challenged on appeal, and were
within this Court's scope of review. First, this Court stated that "at no point did Brunet
assert that the requested transcripts contained specific information relevant to his
appeal" and, therefore, Mr. Brunet merely "hoped to engage in a 'fishing expedition' at
taxpayer expense." (Opinion, p.4.) This statement is a bit misleading though, as the
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court minutes clearly indicate that Mr. Brunet directly addressed the district court at both
hearings. 12 (See R., pp.54, 72.)
Further, although it is not entirely clear what the Court meant when it criticized
Mr. Brunet's so-called "fishing expedition," the reality is that neither Mr. Brunet, nor his
appellate counsel, did anything improper in this case. As discussed above, at both the
change of plea and sentencing hearings, Mr. Brunet personally addressed the district
court; his statements were eligible for use (for or against him) at his original sentencing
hearing, as well as when the district court made the sentencing-related decisions
challenged on appeal; and, consequently, his statements are within the scope of
appellate review in this case. Accordingly, Mr. Brunet has shown a "colorable need" for
the requested transcripts. The fact that Mr. Brunet cannot establish, prior to production
of the requested transcripts, the contents of those transcripts, or exactly how those
contents will impact the claim(s) to be raised on appeal, is of no consequence.

As

Justice Goldberg has explained, it is appellate counsel's job to search the record for
viable appellate issues:
As any effective appellate advocate will attest, the most basic and
fundamental tool of his profession is the complete trial transcript, through
which his trained fingers may leaf and his trained eyes may roam in
search of an error, a lead to an error, or even a basis upon which to urge a
change in an established and hitherto accepted principle of law. Anything
short of a complete transcript is incompatible with effective appellate
advocacy.

Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 288 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (footnote
and citation omitted). 13 Clearly then, appellate counsel cannot know the evidence and
12

These court minutes, neither set of which exceeds two pages in length, were
obviously reviewed carefully by this Court, as their contents are discussed elsewhere in
the Opinion. (See Opinion, p.5 ("Minutes for both of these hearings are part of the
record on appeal and these minutes indicate that Brunet did not object to anything
presented at either hearing.").)
11

the claims to be raised on appeal before reviewing the record in a given case. And this
is especially true where Mr. Brunet is acting through appellate attorneys who did not
represent him below. See id. ("The opinion of the Court agrees with this conclusion as it
relates to 'one whose lawyer on appeal enters the case after the trial is ended.'

I

believe that it is equally applicable to one whose appointed lawyer on appeal was also
his lawyer at trial.") Since, the Idaho Legislature chose to create the State Appellate
Public Defender to represent indigent defendants on appeal only and, therefore, the
vast majority of felony appeals are handled by attorneys with no first-hand knowledge of
the proceedings below,

see l.C. § 19-870, it would be particularly unreasonable to

require the defendant to show what the specific evidence in the record is, and how that
specific evidence will impact the claims to be raised on appeal, before he is entitled to
an adequate appellate record.
Second, the Court has asserted that "the entire record available to the trial court
at sentencing is contained within the record on appeal." (Opinion, pp.5, 6.) That is
incorrect. As Mr. Brunet has argued throughout the pendency of this appeal, because
the transcripts of the change of plea and sentencing hearings are not part of the record
on appeal, there is no record of what Mr. Brunet said when he addressed the district

13

In Hardy, the Supreme Court evaluated a federal statute and, therefore, did not
"reach a consideration of constitutional requirements." Hardy, 375 U.S. at 282.
Nevertheless, it is notable that in that case, the Supreme Court made it clear that
especially in instances where the indigent defendant is provided new counsel for
purposes of appeal, his counsel cannot do his job without a full transcript. See id.
Further, Justice Goldberg, who was joined by Chief Justice Warren, and Justices
Brennan and Stewart, wrote separately to argue that the Court should have gone
further: "[l]n the interests of justice this Court should require, under our supervisory
power, that full transcripts be provided, without limitation, in all federal criminal cases to
defendants who cannot afford to purchase them, whenever they seek to prosecute an
appeal." Id. (Goldberg, J., concurring).
12

court at each of those hearings. And, since Mr. Brunet apparently addressed the district
court in allocution at sentencing (see R., p.72), his statements were important evidence.
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has observed that the defendant's allocution
serves a critical role in our system of justice, as "[t]he most persuasive counsel may not
be able to speak for a defendant as the defendant might, with halting eloquence, speak
for himself."

Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304 (1961).

To ignore this

important evidence in the present appeal is to "unwisely skew" the result. Cf. State v.
Chapman, 111Idaho149, 153 (1986). 14

Furthermore, as this Court's Opinion points out, when the district court made the
sentencing-related decisions challenged in this appeal, i.e., relinquished jurisdiction and
declined to reduce Mr. Brunet's sentence, it specifically considered what had occurred
at Mr. Brunet's original sentencing hearing. (Opinion, p.5; 12/23/11 Tr., p.7, Ls.21-22 ("I
have reviewed my notes from the prior sentencings in this case .... "). 15 ) Thus, not only
does the appellate record not contain "the entire record available to the trial court at

14

In Chapman, this Court held that when determining whether to revoke probation, the
district court should consider all of the information in the case because, to ignore the
aggravating circumstances of the underlying offense, as revealed at the original
sentencing hearing, would be to "unwisely skew the trial court's consideration of the
necessary facts which the court needs in order to properly individualize its decision visa-vis" the defendant. Chapman, 111 Idaho at 153. Likewise, Mr. Brunet submits that to
ignore the mitigating evidence before the district court at the time of the original
sentencing hearing would "unwisely skew" the result in the case.
15
At oral argument in this case, it was suggested that perhaps Mr. Brunet should have
sought to augment the appellate record with Judge Owen's notes, rather than the
transcripts requested. Regardless of whether Mr. Brunet may be entitled to those
notes, the fact is that by referring to his notes, Judge Owen clearly attempted to, and
presumably did, refresh his recollection of what happened at the prior hearings.
Accordingly, Judge Owen's reference to his notes makes it even more clear that the
requested transcripts contain information that was considered by the district court when
it made the decisions challenged in this appeal.
13

sentencing," but it does not contain the entire record available to the trial court when it
made the decisions challenged in this appeal.
Third, and finally, the Court's Opinion suggests that, even if the appellate record
is not complete, it is good enough:
The record on appeal includes the court materials reviewed by the district
court, the minutes from the original plea hearing, the signed Guilty Plea
Advisory, and the minutes and subsequent order from the original
sentencing hearing. The State is only required to provide an indigent
defendant a record on appeal that is sufficient for adequate appellate
review of the errors alleged in the proceeding below. [State v. Strand, 137
Idaho 457, 477 (2002).] The record here is sufficient.
(Opinion, pp.5-6.) However, an appellate record that omits information relevant to the
issues raised on appeal is not good enough, as it is not "sufficient for adequate
appellate review of the errors alleged."

Certainly, where the omitted information or

evidence was before the district court; it was part of the district court's calculus in
rendering the decisions challenged on appeal; and it is within this Court's scope of
review, Mr. Brunet cannot have "as effective an appeal as would be available to the
defendant with resources to pay his own way." Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189,
195 (1971). Accordingly, it cannot be said that "the grounds of appeal" in this case did
not "make out a colorable need for a complete transcript," or that the State carried its
burden "to show that only a portion of the transcript or an 'alternative' will suffice .... "
Id.

In light of the foregoing, Mr. Brunet submits that the reasoning of this Court's
Opinion does not support its conclusion that Mr. Brunet was not entitled to the
transcripts which he sought. He respectfully requests that this Court, therefore, grant
rehearing and either hold that he is entitled to the requested transcripts, or, at a

14

minimum, articulate a clear standard from which future appellants can determine the
transcripts to which they may be entitled.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Brunet respectfully request that this Court grant
rehearing. Assuming it does so, Mr. Brunet prays for the relief requested in his previous
briefs.
DATED this 23rd day of January, 2014.

ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Chief, Appellate Unit
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